Drivers, Options and Approaches for Two Seaport Authorities on the Joint Reduction of Bunker Oil Related Emissions

Abstract

The international agreements, made by International Maritime Organization in 2008 are an encouraging start to reduce the SO2 emissions caused by the use of bunker oil. Port authorities are confronted with a dilemma. From an environmental point of view, a proactive attitude is preferred. However, a unilateral initiative may jeopardize their bunker oil market share. In this article, we study the benefits and drawbacks of collaboration on emissions reduction between the ports of Rotterdam and Singapore. Many options for reducing SO2 emissions and several policies strategies are discussed. Collaboration instead of competition may give a strategic financial advantage as compared to other would-be bunker harbors on the route Europe-Asia. Without a group of dedicated and critical actors, both port authorities do not have the power to enforce policies or options. The Rotterdam system can be regarded as a decentralized multi-actor network. The Singaporean situation may be characterized as a centralized authority. The process design towards cooperation should take into account these differences. Overall, it can be concluded that cooperation between the port authorities of Singapore and Rotterdam has extra benefits compared to a situation without cooperation.